

# Is ECB's monetary policy optimal already?

Fritz Breuss

Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration

Research Institute for European Affairs

Althanstrasse 39-45

A-1090 Vienna/Austria

Fritz.Breuss@wu-wien.ac.at

and

Austrian Institute of Economic Research (Wifo),

P.O. Box 91

A-1103 Vienna/Austria

Fritz.Breuss@wifo.ac.at

May 25, 2002

## Abstract:

Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. Nevertheless, this paper asks whether monetary policy could not have been improved. In the last three years, Euroland was confronted with the first external shock. Oil prices increased considerably, leading to an increase of headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000/2001. With a specific Taylor rule one can very well understand, how the ECB sets interest rates, but it turns out that monetary policy based on the estimated Taylor reaction function was rather backward than forward-looking. While it reacted with a lag to the actions of the US Fed, it was overly cautious by targeting total HICP inflation. Here it is strongly argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy oriented towards "core" inflation would have resulted in a much better economic performance. The business cycle downturn could have been mitigated with no additional inflation risks.

**Keywords:** EMU, Monetary Policy, Euro, Model Simulations

**JEL-Classification:** E5, E52, E58, E47

## I. Introduction

Given the external conditions the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of the European Union (EU) has been quite a success so far. When the EMU started its third stage with 11 out of 15 EU member states in January 1999, the European and US business cycle were still on an upswing. GDP growth was satisfactory, inflation was low, even some kind of convergence of the European business cycle was visible. However, the high value of the Euro at the start was not sustainable, its exchange rate against major currencies depreciated continuously. Then, in 2000, oil prices increased sharply, fuelled inflation in the industrial world and initiated a faltering of the cycle in the second half of that year, starting in the USA and followed by Europe. In 2001 (Greece became the 12<sup>th</sup> member of Euroland), the decline continued, accelerated by the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. On the eve of the change-over from a “virtual” Euroland to a real one (the Euro became legal tender as of January 2002), the world economic situation is characterized by a unique constellation: the triad (USA, EU and Japan) are in recession simultaneously. The recession hitting the euro area can be seen largely as a symmetric shock experienced by all Member States.<sup>1</sup> However, whereas the USA and Japan are counteracting with an active fiscal policy, the EU and Euroland in particular are standing aside. Fiscal policy, still decentralized and in the responsibility of the EU member states has to fulfill – in a complicated co-ordination process - the targets of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which should result in a balanced budget over the cycle. Monetary policy, conducted centrally by the European Central Bank (ECB) reacted by reducing interest rates, but more backward than forward looking and – compared to US’s Fed - partly too late. So, Europe can only hope that the upswing in the USA will spill over and induce an export-led growth.

The major argument which is put forward in this paper is that the ECB’s reaction to the first external shock, the oil price surge in 2000 and 2001, was quite satisfactory but not optimal.<sup>2</sup> The second chapter – after a short description of the economic policy framework in EMU - discusses the two pillar strategy of the ECB and its performance so far. It questions whether really two pillars are necessary and estimates a specific Taylor rule to understand the interest-rate setting of the ECB. The implications of the oil price shock are the topic of the third chapter. It is demonstrated that this temporary supply shock led to an

---

<sup>1</sup> For this interpretation, see *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002) p. 12.

<sup>2</sup> In our analysis, optimality is not understood as the theoretical outcome of an optimization process (for an integrated approach of such concepts, see e.g. *Clarida/Jordi/Mark* (2001) but the empirical demonstration

asymmetric impact on Euroland's Member States and hence increased inflation and output dispersion. In the fourth chapter the economic outcome of an alternative monetary policy reaction to this shock is analyzed. It turns out that the overall economic performance could have been improved when targeting not headline but core inflation. Conclusions are drawn in section five.

## II. ECB's Two Pillar Strategy in Action

### A. *The asymmetric economic policy framework in EMU*

The introduction of the euro and the conduct of the single monetary policy by the independent European Central Bank (ECB) have fundamentally changed the framework within which the European Community and its Member States conduct their economic policies.<sup>3</sup> Building on the existing framework of the Single Market, the specific design of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), as laid down by the Maastricht Treaty (now in the version of the Nice Treaty), transfers the competence for monetary and exchange rate policies to the Community level (see the EC Treaty chapter entitled "Monetary policy" – Title VII, Chapter 2), while leaving the responsibilities for fiscal policies (see the EC Treaty chapter entitled "Economic Policy" - Title VII, Chapter 1), labor market and employment policies (see the EC Treaty chapter entitled "Employment" – Title VIII) and for many microeconomic and structural policies in the hands of the national or subnational authorities. In contrast to the USA with its coherent centralized economic and monetary policy framework (although the US states have some autonomy) in EMU we are confronted with a complex system of multi-level economic governance – characterized by the interplay of central monetary policy-making and decentralized economic (mainly fiscal) policy-making. This asymmetry may be either considered as a "design flaw"<sup>4</sup> or as a strength for the EU.<sup>5</sup>

Due to this asymmetric design, the EC Treaty foresees a structured interaction among policy-makers, ranging from more or less constraining forms of policy co-ordination (e.g. via the Stability and Growth Pact - SGP)<sup>6</sup> to a free play of competing policy designs. As EU

---

via model simulations that an alternative monetary policy would have led to a better overall economic outcome in the Euro area.

<sup>3</sup> *Eijffinger/de Haan* (2000) and *Issing et al.* (2001) describe ECB's policies in detail.

<sup>4</sup> See *Breuss* (2000b) p. 275.

<sup>5</sup> See *ECB* (2001b) p. 54.

<sup>6</sup> *Canzoneri/Cumby/Diba* (2001) within a new "fiscal" theory of price determination approach, come to the conclusion that a common currency area is not viable if fiscal policy in two or more of the EMU members is Non-Ricardian. They find that constraints written into the SGP are sufficient for a Ricardian regime. In a Ricardian regime, fiscal policy has discipline in the sense that current and/or future primary surpluses are actively adjusted to satisfy the government's public sector's present value budget constraint (PVBC) for any real value of current government liabilities. In this regime, monetary policy provides the nominal anchor, and the price level is determined in a conventional manner. Non-Ricardian regimes, by contrast, lack fiscal discipline. For a thorough analysis of the SGP, see *Brunila/Buti/Franco* (2001). Although it would make more

Member States regard their economic policies as a “matter of common concern” (EC Treaty, Article 99(1)), they shall co-ordinate them. Economic policy-co-ordination (postulated in EC Treaty, Article 4 and Article 99) is necessary to avoid potential negative spillovers across countries and across policies.<sup>7</sup> It is executed in a complicated multilevel process.<sup>8</sup> In order to give coherence to the overall economic policy framework, the EC Treaty establishes the annual Broad Economic Policy Guidelines (BEPG; see EC Treaty, Article 99(2)) as the principal and overarching policy instrument for the co-ordination of economic policies at Community level. These guidelines, which – with due respect for the independent and statutory mandate of the ECB – do not apply to monetary policy, render operational the fundamental principles of close co-ordination. BEPG is the pivot of the more specialized co-ordination and consultation process of multilateral surveillance (for fiscal policy – via the SGP with stability and convergence programs on the budgetary stances (debt/deficit data); employment policy – via the “Luxembourg Process” with employment guidelines and National Action Plans; micro/structural policies – via the “Cardiff Process” with multilateral review of economic reforms; macroeconomic dialogue among social partners, governments, ECB, Commission – via the “Cologne Process”; “open method of co-ordination” – via the “Lisbon Process” providing a more coherent setting of targets and periodic monitoring and evaluation of the results) and gives the principal policy messages. The role of monetary policy in the overall economic policy framework is unique. Although the single monetary policy represents a fundamental pillar of the system of economic governance in the euro area and the ECB is part of the overall economic policy framework there is no overall co-ordination of economic and monetary policy in EMU. There is only a structured exchange of information and views with other policy-makers (e.g. in the major co-ordination body, the Economic and Financial Committee ; see EC Treaty, Article 114(2)). However, the contacts between the independent ECB and the finance ministry are to be understood only as a non-binding open policy dialogue and should be “... in no way misunderstood as an ex ante co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policy stances. In the same vein, the regular and structured dialogue between the ECB and national governments clearly excludes any ex ante policy co-ordination or joint agreements aimed at achieving a predetermined policy-mix.”<sup>9</sup> This attitude of only an informal policy dialogue may of course lead to non-optimal outcomes

---

intellectual sense to apply deficit ceilings to the cyclically-adjusted budget instead of the SGP target of a balanced total budget, the calculation of potential output is controversial. Therefore *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002, p. 13) suggest “to delegate to an independent body the production of estimates of trends in potential output in Member States”.

<sup>7</sup> See *ECB* (2001b) pp. 55-56.

<sup>8</sup> See *ECB* (2001b) p. 65; (2000b) 285 et seqq.

<sup>9</sup> *ECB* (2001b) p. 64.

with respect to an overall<sup>10</sup> (monetary and fiscal policy) co-ordination.<sup>11</sup> In contrast to the US system, the EMU is missing an arrangement of fiscal federalism.<sup>12</sup> Even more, the individual responsibility of the Member States in the field of budgetary policy is explicitly underscored by the EC Treaty's "no bail-out" clause (Article 103), which stipulates that neither the Community nor any Member State shall be liable for the commitments of another Member State.

*B. Two or only one pillar in ECB's monetary policy strategy?*

In October and December 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB announced the main elements of its stability-oriented monetary policy strategy to the public. The strategy guides the single monetary policy of the Eurosystem, i.e. the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the Member States which adopted the euro. The stability-oriented strategy of the Eurosystem consists of three main elements: a quantitative definition of the Eurosystem's primary objective, namely price stability (EC Treaty, Article 105(1)), and the "two pillars" of the strategy used to achieve this objective. These pillars are represented by giving money a prominent role (pillar one), as signaled by the announcement of a quantitative reference value for the growth rate of a broad monetary aggregate (M3), and by a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments (pillar two) and risks to price stability in the euro area as a whole.<sup>13</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> See *Breuss/Weber* (2001).

<sup>11</sup> *Beetsma/Debrun/Klaassen* (2001) investigate the circumstances under which co-ordination may be desirable. It turns out that co-ordination is beneficial when the correlation of the shocks hitting the various economies is low. Generally, the scope for fiscal co-ordination is larger under asymmetric shocks, because the ECB remains passive as average inflation in the union is unaffected.

<sup>12</sup> Whether fiscal federalism is something one should worry about in EMU is an open question. For a discussion of the different arguments, see *Breuss* (2000a).

<sup>13</sup> See *ECB* (1999a).

**Table 1: Macro-economic performance of EU Member States**  
(averages 1999-2001)

		GDP, real	HICP <sup>1)</sup> infla- tion	Unem- ploy- ment rate	General govern- ment budget balance	Gross public debt	Current account
	Euro area ins and outs	annual %- change	annual %- change	(in %)	(in % of GDP)	(in % of GDP)	(in % of GDP)
Belgium	*B	2.77	2.07	7.57	-0.17	110.97	4.80
Denmark	DK	2.20	2.37	4.83	2.60	47.10	2.50
Germany	*D	1.83	1.70	8.10	-0.97	60.53	-0.63
Greece	*EL	3.93	2.87	11.10	-0.97	101.90	-4.00
Spain	*E	3.63	3.13	14.33	-0.43	60.70	-2.93
France	*F	2.67	1.40	9.80	-1.50	57.73	1.80
Ireland	*IRL	9.60	3.93	4.53	3.07	40.73	-0.57
Italy	*I	2.10	2.33	10.43	-1.10	110.93	0.43
Luxembourg	*L	6.40	2.47	2.33	4.73	5.53	20.03
Netherlands	*NL	2.90	3.17	2.90	1.30	57.00	4.97
Austria	*A	2.30	1.63	3.83	-1.17	63.37	-2.83
Portugal	*P	2.83	3.10	4.13	-1.87	53.90	-9.20
Finland	*FIN	3.40	2.33	9.73	4.53	44.67	6.80
Sweden	S	3.17	1.53	6.10	3.23	57.90	3.57
United Kingdom	UK	2.43	1.12	5.57	2.23	42.60	-2.00
EU-15	EU	2.53	2.10	8.33	-0.03	64.80	0.00
Euro area	*EUR	2.57	2.10	9.03	-0.70	70.57	0.23

<sup>1)</sup> HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices.

Source: Autumn 2001 Forecasts for 2001-2003, European Economy, Supplement A, No. 10/11 – October/November, Brussels, 2001.

In contrast to the Fed, the Governing Council of the ECB has adopted a concrete definition for price stability: “price stability shall be defined as a year-on-year increase in the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area<sup>14</sup> of below 2%”.<sup>15</sup> Price stability according to his definition “is to be maintained over the medium term”.<sup>16</sup> However, the ECB did not exactly define the length of the “medium term”. Setting a fixed target has

<sup>14</sup> *De Grauwe/Piskorsi* (2001) investigate whether it makes a difference as far as the effectiveness of alternative loss functions of the ECB is concerned whether its policy is based on the union-wide aggregates (as is done in practice) or on the national data (on output, inflation and interest rates) of the member states. The main conclusion is that the monetary policy strategy of the ECB based on the union-wide aggregates may be a reasonable proxy of the optimal policy rule based on the national data of the member states.

<sup>15</sup> *Benigno* (2001) investigates the optimal monetary policy in a currency area within the framework of a two-region, general equilibrium model with monopolistic competition and price stickiness. His framework delivers a simple welfare criterion based on the utility of the consumers that has the usual trade-off between stabilizing inflation and output. Only if the two regions share the same degree of nominal rigidity, the optimal outcome is obtained by targeting a weighted average of the regional inflation rates. These weights coincide with the economic size of the regions (which is done when calculating the actual HICP inflation for the euro area). If the degrees of rigidity are different, the optimal plan implies a higher degree of inertia in the inflation rate. But an inflation targeting policy, in which higher weight is given to the inflation in the region with higher degrees of nominal rigidity, is nearly optimal. Highest wage rigidity can be found in Spain, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, Ireland and Germany. The highest wage flexibility was measured in France, Italy and Austria; see *Benigno* (2001) p. 52.

the advantage of credibility, the disadvantage is the loss of flexibility. A medium-term orientation of monetary policy ensures genuine and meaningful accountability. It implies the need for monetary policy to have a forward-looking, medium-term orientation. It also acknowledges the existence of short-term volatility in prices, resulting from non-monetary shocks to the price level.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, as will be seen, in practice these sound arguments are mere wishful thinking. If the primary objective is satisfied, the ECB shall support the general economic policies of the EU, laid down in Article 2 of the EC Treaty (“... to promote a harmonious, balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-inflationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic performance, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of environment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States”). Thus the Treaty gives the ECB a “double mandate”.<sup>18</sup>

As one sees from table 1, the inflation rate objective in the first years of EMU was nearly fulfilled in the euro area as a whole with a HICP inflation rate of 2.1% on average 1999-2001. However, the dispersion over the Euroland member states was considerable, ranging from 1.4% in France to 3.9% in Ireland. Since the early nineties one sees a strong convergence of inflation rates starting with a standard deviation value for EUR-12 (euro area with 12 member states) of over 5 in 1990 to below one in 2001. The expectation of a “zero dispersion” for the EU as a consequence of the “law of one price” due to the impact of the Single Market (more competition on an integrated market) and additionally because of the Single Currency in the EMU is an illusion.<sup>19</sup> But also the other macro variables – be it GDP growth (varying from 1.8% in Germany to 9.6% in Ireland with an EUR-12 average of 2.6% over the period 1999-2001) or unemployment (varying from 2.3% in Luxembourg to 14.3% in Spain with an EUR-12 average of 9% between 1999-2001) – still exhibit considerable differences in Euroland. Besides the progress made in bringing down inflation, due to the pressure of the SGP the fiscal position of the member states of Euroland

---

<sup>16</sup> See *ECB* (1999a) p. 46.

<sup>17</sup> E.g. the result of indirect tax changes or variations in international commodity – in particular oil – prices; see *ECB* (1999a) p. 47.

<sup>18</sup> See also *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002) p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> The European Commission *EU* (2001c) demonstrated why the “law of one price” (an integrated market with no transport costs product prices expressed in the same currency should not geographically differ) in the EU fails and is also an elusive goal when taking the US economy as a benchmark. There are many factors behind the large and persistent price dispersion in the EU: the Balassa/Samuelson effect; growing importance of services; price-setting behavior for branded goods depending on local preferences. In 1998, price dispersion was higher in the EU (15%) than in the USA (12%). However, EU price dispersion declined – due to the Single Market – during the 1990s.

improved considerably. However, whereas some countries have already reached surpluses in their budget balances (e.g. Luxembourg and Finland with +4 ½% of GDP, Ireland with +3% - all countries with higher than average GDP growth in the last years), some countries still have a – albeit minor – deficit position (e.g. France, Germany, Italy with around –1% of GDP). Similarly, the debt to GDP ratios are still above 100% of GDP in Belgium, Greece and Italy, whereas all the other Euroland member states are already below or close to the Maastricht reference value of 60% of GDP (see table 1).

An important factor behind the increase in inflation in 2000 and 2001 has been import price development, in particular oil price and exchange rate movements. The euro depreciated against the US-Dollar continuously after the start of EMU in 1999, resulting in a decline of around 25% (see figure 1). Whether the dispersion of inflation within the euro area is only due to diverging business cycles or whether the higher inflation is an equilibrium phenomenon due to the working of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is undecided.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, the oil price shock certainly has hit the Member States of Euroland asymmetrically, as will be demonstrated in chapter 3 when investigating the economic impact of the first external shock. The world oil price which is still denominated in US-Dollars increased from 11 \$/barrel in the first quarter of 1999 to a peak of 30.3 \$/barrel in the third quarter of 2000. The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 only very temporarily accelerated the oil price rise and prices plummeted afterwards in view of a drastic demand shortage because of the recessions in the USA and in Europe. In figure 2 the actual development of the world oil price since 1996 is contrasted with a “smoothing” of the price development since 1999. This implies an oil price increase over this period of around 30%. As a consequence, energy prices contributed somewhat more than half of the 2.1% rise in overall HICP inflation in the euro area in 1999-2001.<sup>21</sup> Although there are many concepts to calculate “core” inflation (see ECB, 2001a for an overview),<sup>22</sup> the most prominent and widely used method is that which extract the most

---


<sup>20</sup> Whereas *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) pp. 16-18, dismiss the Balassa/Samuelson effect (relative price increase of fast-growing (catching-up) countries – more precisely as a consequence of faster growing productivity in the tradable sector compared to the non-tradable sector of an economy) as quantitatively relevant for the inflation dispersion in Euroland; *Reutter/Sinn* (2000) find that as a result of the Balassa/Samuelson effect relative prices change rapidly between and within the euro countries. They derive a minimum inflation rate for Euroland (compatible with the requirement that no country face a deflation) of 0.94% for EUR-11 and of 1.13% for an enlarged Euroland (EUR-21). Within EUR-11 the minimum inflation varies between 0% in Germany and 2.7% in Finland and 2.4% in Ireland, 1.5% in Spain and Italy, 1.4% in the Netherlands, Austria and France, 0.8% in Belgium and Portugal; *Reutter/Sinn* (2000) p. 13.

<sup>21</sup> See *ECB*, Monthly Bulletin (June 2001) p. 37; see also *EU* (2001a) p. 45.

<sup>22</sup> *Cristadoro/Forni/Reichlin/Veronese* (2001) propose an index of core inflation for the euro area that exploits information from a large panel of time series (400) on disaggregated prices, industrial production, labor market indicators, and financial and monetary variables. The indicator serves as a reliable forecaster of the euro area HICP at one and two years horizon.


volatile components of overall (“headline”) HICP inflation. Excluding unprocessed food and energy, the so defined “core” HICP inflation<sup>23</sup> was below the ECB target of 2% (see figure 3) and around one percentage point lower than “headline” HICP inflation.<sup>24</sup> Such or similar reflections are undertaken by the ECB in its context of the “second pillar” of monetary strategy via a broadly based assessment of the outlook for price developments. As will be argued in this paper, the concentration on “core” instead of “headline” HICP inflation would have optimized monetary policy and resulted in a better overall economic outcome in the EU – at least in the period 2000-2001.

**Figure 1: Euro exchange rates**  
(national currencies per Euro; 1999M01 = 100)



Source: European Central Bank (ECB).


**Figure 2: World oil price (Brent crude spot; USD/barrel)**



Source: Oxford Economic Forecasting world model.

<sup>23</sup> See ECB, Monthly Bulletin (June 2001) p. 37.

<sup>24</sup> See ECB (2001a) p. 58.

**Figure 3: HICP inflation rates in the euro area– headline and core (in %)**

Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators

HICP = Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (“headline” = total index) HICP “core” = HICP total excluding energy, food, tobacco, alcohol.

Before analyzing the concrete monetary policy reaction of the ECB to the first external shock (the sharp oil price increase), the importance of the “first pillar” of monetary strategy, the prominent role for money, defined as the annual growth rate of the broad monetary aggregate (M3) is looked at. On December 1, 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB has chosen to announce a reference value for the aggregate M3, defined in an encompassing manner to include not only currency in circulation and the conventional deposit components of broad money, but also both the shares/units of money market funds (MMFs) and debt securities issued by monetary financial institutions.<sup>25</sup> The announced reference value was derived from the quantity theory of money, based on the following medium-term assumptions:<sup>26</sup>  $Mv = PQ$ . P is the inflation rate (HICP), defined as below 2%; Q is the trend of real GDP growth in the range of 2-2.5% per annum; v is the velocity of circulation of M3 which, in the medium term, appears to be declining by 0.5-1% each year. Taking into consideration that the actual trend decline in velocity is likely to lie below the stated values, this results in an annual growth of M (M3) of 4.5% per annum, the reference value set by the Governing Council for M3. A look at figure 4 indicates that since the start of EMU the actual growth has deviated from the simple self-declared reference value most of the time. M3 growth exhibited a continuous decline since the mid-eighties,<sup>27</sup> from annual rates of over 10% to 7% in the early nineties and declining to 5% at the eve of the third phase of

<sup>25</sup> MFIs; see *ECB* (1999b) p. 35.

<sup>26</sup> See *ECB* (1999a) pp. 48-49.

<sup>27</sup> See *ECB* (1999b) p. 37.

EMU starting in 1999. When, however, the reference value for M3 is missed so often, one may ask whether one should not give up this “first pillar” anyway. Some, like *Svensson*<sup>28</sup> mean that “the first pillar is actually a brick”. In its third report “Monitoring the European Central Bank” *Alesina et al*<sup>29</sup> are somewhat more mild in evaluating the M3 pillar. First, they remark that it may be somewhat absurd to talk about monetary policy without talking about money. However, in its mission, to maintain price stability in the medium term, the growth rate of M3 can only be a servant in this quest and not a target in itself. Whether it is a useful servant,<sup>30</sup> has to be evaluated. However, they conclude by stating, that “to demonstrate the overriding importance of price stability, it would be useful to move the growth rate of M3 to the side”.<sup>31</sup> In its fourth report “Monitoring the European Central Bank” *Begg et al*<sup>32</sup> call it already the “poison pillar”. In spite of two adjustments in the M3 series (removal of non-resident holdings of money market fund shares/units and of short-term debt instruments in May 2001 and October 2001 respectively)<sup>33</sup> the monetary pillar is for many reasons of no use at all. On the one hand, it is no good guide for signaling inflation<sup>34</sup>, on the other hand money demand is highly volatile. This is the principal reason that most central banks discarded monetary targeting long ago. Lastly, the monetary pillar detracts from the ECB’s successes and hence could erode credibility.<sup>35</sup>

For a while, the ECB treated the exchange rate with benign neglect. It has argued, correctly, that its task is to maintain price stability in the euro area, not to target a particular exchange rate. But in September 2000, a joint intervention by the ECB and the Federal Reserve to shore up the weak euro – mainly because the coincidence of boosting oil prices and devaluation of the euro could endanger the main objective of price stability in the euro area - was publicly discussed and then implemented for the first time. The effect was only fleeting: after a short blip, the euro depreciated even further. The decline of the euro stopped only with news that the economy in the United States has started to slow down. A striking example was the very short-lived blip after September 11, 2001. Should the ECB be concerned about exchange rate fluctuations? *Alesina et al*<sup>36</sup> answer with a qualified no. No,

---

<sup>28</sup> See *Svensson* (2000) p. 97.

<sup>29</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) pp. 47-48).

<sup>30</sup> Given that the longer-term trends in the growth of money stock M3 are only very loosely correlated with the annual rate of consumer price inflation; see *ECB* (1999b) p. 39.

<sup>31</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) p. 48.

<sup>32</sup> See *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002) pp. 18-21.

<sup>33</sup> See *ECB*, Monthly Bulletin (November 2001) p. 10.


<sup>34</sup> *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002, p. 21) demonstrate that across 100 countries the long-run relation between money growth and inflation (1970-99) is very strong. However, the cross-section of the countries over the same period with low inflation countries – like the present Euroland countries - (inflation rates below 5%) the relation is only very weak.

<sup>35</sup> See *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002) p. 18.

<sup>36</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) p. 40.

because official interventions are small in comparison to the amounts traded daily on the foreign exchange rate markets. No, unless the ECB's intervention signals a shift in policy and such a signal is enough to change market beliefs. And the EC Treaty lays down that any exchange rate policy should be consistent with the primary objective of the ECB's monetary policy, which is to maintain price stability. Article 111 of the EC Treaty foresees a close interaction between the EU Council and the ECB with regard to the exchange rate policy.<sup>37</sup>

**Figure 4: Growth of money M3 in the euro area (EUR-12)**  
(annual growth in %, seasonally adjusted)




Source: OECD, Main Economic Indicators.

### *C. How does the ECB set interest rates?*

The Governing Council of the ECB sets three kinds of interest rates: a) those for main refinancing operations, b) those for marginal lending facility (over-night money) and c) those for deposit facility. The main instrument in the following analysis is the interest rate for main refinancing operations (MFO). In figure 5 a comparison of the development of ECB's MFO with the main instrument of US's Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (in the following shortened "Fed"), the Federal Funds rate is made.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. to conclude formal agreements on an exchange rate system for the euro in relation to non-Community currencies or to formulate general orientations for exchange rate policy; see also *ECB* (2001b) pp. 57-58.

**Figure 5: Interest rates in the euro area and in the USA**

Sources: ECB and USA Federal Reserve Board.

The ECB started with an interest rate for MFO of 3% and made the first interest rate cut in April 1999 to 2.5%. In November 1999 it raised the rate again to 3% and thereafter several times up to the peak of 4.75% in October 2000. After staying on this level for seven months, in May 2001 the ECB began to cut the rates consecutively down to 3.25% which has been maintained since November 2001. The Federal Funds rate already stood higher at the beginning of 1999 (at 4.6%) and was increased progressively to a peak of 6.5% in May 2000. After staying at this level for four months from January 2001, the Fed cut the rates in several steps to 1.75% in December 2001, the lowest level since the Second World War.<sup>38</sup> Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, on September 17, 2001, in a co-ordinated action the Fed and the ECB cut their interest rates by ½ percentage point. Additionally, in a transatlantic financial close co-ordination the ECB and the US Federal Reserve agreed upon on a swap arrangement on September 12, 2001 in order to facilitate the functioning of financial markets and provide liquidity in US dollars. The ECB was eligible to draw up to USD 50 billion on a swap line that expired on October 13, 2001. In exchange,

<sup>38</sup> *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002, p. 45) deal with the popular allegation that the ECB cut interest rates both too little and too late when the recession became obvious in 2001. They conclude in favor of the ECB, however, that the faster reductions in interest rates in the USA in 2001 than in Europe reflected a more rapid deterioration in economic conditions (sharper drop in GDP growth) rather than any systematic difference in how the ECB and the Fed respond to new information. Therefore they find that the 2001 cuts in ECB interest rates were “business as usual”.

the Fed of New York would receive euro deposits of an equivalent amount at the ECB.<sup>39</sup> All in all the September 11, 2001 increased uncertainty for policy making in addition to the general phenomenon of rising uncertainty near turning points in the business cycle.<sup>40</sup>

As a first observation, figure 5 gives the impression that – given the different inflation and growth performance of both regions - the ECB is following the Fed in setting their interest rate with a time lag – although the periodicity of the lag seems not to be fixed. In effect, a test for the period since January 1999 shows that the Federal Funds rate Granger-causes ECB’s interest rate for MFO with a lag of four months. Looking only on the 3-months interest rates one finds that US’s interest rates Granger-cause Euroland’s interest rates with a lag of three months. It is therefore not implausible to consider Fed’s interest rate policy in the reaction function of the ECB.

Taylor’s (1993, 2001) original feedback policy rule described monetary policy under Greenspan:<sup>41</sup>

$$(1) \quad i_t = \bar{r} + \mathbf{p}_t + \mathbf{g}_1(\mathbf{p}_t - \mathbf{p}^T) + \mathbf{g}_2(y_t - y^*)$$

where  $i_t$  is Fed’s nominal interest rate in quarter  $t$ ;  $\bar{r}$  is the steady-state equilibrium value of the short-term real interest rate (the “natural rate”);  $\mathbf{p}_t$  is the actual inflation rate in quarter  $t$ ;  $\mathbf{p}^T$  is the inflation target;  $y_t$  is actual output in quarter  $t$ ;  $y^*$  is potential output;  $\mathbf{g}_1, \mathbf{g}_2$  are coefficients, determining the degree of the interest rate reaction of the Fed to deviations of inflation and output from its targets. Taylor did not estimate this equation, but calibrated it. He suggested the same weights for both coefficients ( $\mathbf{g}_1 = \mathbf{g}_2 = 0.5$ ). He also assumed that the “natural” interest rate and the inflation rate target were both equal to 2 ( $\bar{r} = \mathbf{p}^T = 2$ ).

As the ECB has as its primary objective maintaining price stability, the same weights for inflation and output targeting are obviously not adequate for Euroland. *Alesina et al*<sup>42</sup> experimented with several variations of Taylor’s rule. Simply calibrating the Taylor rule

<sup>39</sup> ECB, Monthly Bulletin (November 2001) p.17 for the detailed report on the utilization of the swap line. This example of an internationally coordinated monetary policy is a rare example where it makes sense. According to *Issing* (2001) such responses should only occur under extreme circumstances. *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002, pp. 26-30) in a survey of policy co-ordination in the new open economy macroeconomics literature conclude, that there is no simple answer as to the benefits of policy co-ordination. E.g., increased financial integration may reduce the gains from policy co-ordination. Also the sources of co-ordination gains differ across model specifications. And, a commitment by central banks to rules-based monetary strategies can do much to improve performance relative to a discretionary regime, with the marginal gain to implementing a coordinated approach correspondingly smaller.

<sup>40</sup> For a discussion of theoretical and practical arguments of interest rate decisions in an uncertain environment, see *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002), pp.31-46.

<sup>41</sup> See also *Schuberth* (2000) p. 24.

<sup>42</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) 27 et seqq.

would have called for a tighter policy than that actually pursued by the ECB. Similarly, a simplified Taylor rule, called **p**-rule, because only inflation targeting (the first term of equation (1)) is considered, would also have led to a tighter monetary policy stance – at least after the rate cut in April 1999. The continuing substantial inflation differentials within the euro area could cause conflict, if the National Central Bank (NCB) governors simply exclusively pursued their national interests and pushed for interest rate decisions that are consistent with inflation in their home country, rather than in the euro area as a whole. *Alesina et al* clearly rule out that hypothesis by calculating the hypothetical interest rates for all member states of Euroland implied by their simple **p**-rule. The interest rate set by the ECB at the beginning of EMU falls right in the middle of the distribution of the hypothetical national interest. Over time, however, the aggregates of hypothetical national interest rates lay above the actual ECB interest rate, with Ireland accounting for the largest deviation, followed by the Netherlands – in line with the inflation performance since 1999. The assumption of nationalist voting would have introduced a contractionary bias in the ECB policy, which was not the case. Furthermore, the ECB appears to have pursued an interest rate policy that has been more attuned to inflation developments in three countries (France, Germany, and Austria), than to those in the euro area as a whole.<sup>43</sup> Finally, *Alesina et al*<sup>44</sup> try an ad hoc “hybrid rule”, whereby the ECB responds quite aggressively (with a coefficient as high as 2) to both core inflation and the inflation forecasts (both expressed in terms of deviations from target, and receiving equal weights; assuming a steady-state real rate of 2.5%). This rule appears to track the actual pattern of interest rates in EMU much better. It takes into consideration the transitory price increase due to the oil price development and also implies a forward-looking behavior by the ECB. In 2001, however, the “hybrid rule” deviated systematically from ECB target.<sup>45</sup> Therefore *Begg et al*<sup>46</sup> try a “new rule” which weights core HICP and GDP growth with coefficients of 2.0 and 0.8 respectively, assuming that the long-run real rate is 2.0%, the core inflation target is 2.0% and target output growth is 1.2%. This “new rule” appears to do a much better job than the “hybrid rule” at least in 2001.

In the following the Taylor rule for ECB’s behavior since 1999 is not calibrated but econometrically estimated. The time of experience may be too short, to derive already sound conclusions on ECB’s policy making. The ECB is of course still in stage of experiencing. Future analyses may therefore come to different conclusions than those presented here for

---

<sup>43</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) pp. 30-31.

<sup>44</sup> See *Alesina/Blanchard/Gali/Giavazzi/Uhlig* (2001) p. 34.

<sup>45</sup> See *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002), p. 44.

<sup>46</sup> See *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane* (2002), p. 44.

the first three years of EMU. Two kinds of reaction functions are offered. The first is a dynamic form of the traditional Taylor rule as defined in equation (1) but with a dynamic specification, taking into account the lagged dependent interest rate variable<sup>47</sup>:

$$(2) \quad i_t^{ECB} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{g}_1(\mathbf{p}_t - \mathbf{p}^T) + \mathbf{g}_2(y_t - y^*) + \mathbf{r}i_{t-1}^{ECB}.$$

We use the GMM estimation procedure yielding (asymptotically) correct standard errors with instruments – primarily the lagged values of inflation and output gap (see table 2 for details). In this equation – which will be called the “baseline reaction function” – we define the constant term  $\mathbf{a} = \bar{r} + \mathbf{p}_t$  and introduce the lagged dependent variable.  $i_t^{ECB}$  is the monthly interest rate of the ECB for main refinancing operations (MFO).  $\mathbf{p}_t$  is the monthly rate of HICP inflation.  $\mathbf{p}^T$  is set at 2%, the official inflation rate target of the ECB.  $y_t$  is the monthly index of industrial production seasonally adjusted.  $y^*$  is the Hodrick/Prescott trend of  $y_t$ . The first cut of interest rates by the ECB in April 1999 by 500 basis points is not easily explained economically. It might have been rather a politically motivated decision following the demands by the former German minister of finance with some time lag. Therefore we introduce a dummy variable to catch that decision.

Several attempts to estimate the parameters for the inflation gap in a forward looking approach as *Clarida/Gali/Gertler* (1998) did for the G3 (Germany, Japan, and the US) and the E3 (UK, France, and Italy) for the period 1979-1993 by substituting the inflation gap by an expression like  $\mathbf{g}_1(E[\mathbf{p}_{t+n}/\Omega_t] - \mathbf{p}^T)$  were not successful.<sup>48</sup>  $n$  would be the horizon of the inflation forecast that is considered by the ECB. *Clarida et al*<sup>49</sup> used one year, so that with monthly data,  $n = 12$ . This procedure would be too short for the first phase of EMU.  $E$  is the expectation operator and  $\Omega_t$  is the information available to the ECB at the time it sets interest rates.

The estimated constant (long-run value 4.02) of equation (2) represents the steady-state value of the real short-term interest rate plus the inflation rate  $(\bar{r} + \mathbf{p}_t)$ . The long-run coefficients (see table 2) reflect the main preferences of the ECB pretty well: price stability is given much more weight (0.80) than deviations from potential output (0.25).

---

<sup>47</sup> *Goodhart* (1999) successfully estimated Taylor Rules with lagged interest rates for the Bank of England (1992-1998). A significant coefficient on lagged interest rates (as in our estimates in table 2) – in particular in times of high uncertainty as in 2001 - indicates a cost of adjusting interest rates. When shocks occur, the short-run response of interest rates is less than the long-run response.

<sup>48</sup> See also *Clarida* (2001).

<sup>49</sup> *Clarida/Gali/Gertler* (1998) p. 1042.

An alternative estimation of the Taylor rule explaining the interest rate setting of the ECB – here preferred – additionally introduces as explaining variable the lagged Federal Funds rate.

$$(3) \quad i_t^{ECB} = \mathbf{a} + \mathbf{g}_1(\mathbf{p}_t - \mathbf{p}^T) + \mathbf{g}_2(y_t - y^*) + \mathbf{g}_3^{Fed} + \mathbf{r}i_{t-1}^{ECB}.$$

The specification and instrumentation are equivalent to that in equation (2). Based on the Granger causality tests we introduce the Federal Funds rate with a lag of four months.<sup>50</sup> This reaction function – we call it “alternative reaction function” - fits better the actual interest rate development in EMU (see table 2 for the estimated coefficients). Again the long-run coefficients indicate the preference pattern of the ECB (more weight to inflation targeting than to output targeting). But now the ECB seems to follow the policy steps by the Fed. Such a behavior of young institutions like the ECB is plausible because it has to be cautious in building up credibility and competence.

A comparison of the “baseline” with the “alternative” reaction function (see figure 6) shows that the “alternative” Taylor rule better explains the turning point of ECB’s interest rate policy in Spring 2001 than the “baseline” Taylor rule. The latter would have exhibited a kind of “overshooting” whereas the former explains quite well the actual development of the MFO.

---

<sup>50</sup> In this context one could consider the interaction of the ECB and the Fed as a two-country monetary policy game where the reaction functions of both countries (central banks) depend on each other’s reaction; see *McKibbin/Sachs* (1991) p. 160. In a symmetric case (when both, the USA and Euroland are assumed to be of equal size) a cooperative policy stance would lead to a better overall outcome than a noncooperative (Nash-Cournot) policy stance: output would be higher, interest rates would be lower. In a noncooperative equilibrium, each country perceives that it can be made marginally better off by appreciating its currency and exporting inflation to the foreign country. Because both countries pursue this strategy in the symmetric case, the exchange rate does not change, but policies are overcontractionary. Considering the estimated adjusted Taylor reaction function of equation (3) and assuming that the Fed sets interest rates according to the original Taylor rule without taking the ECB action into account, one could rather think of a monetary policy game à la Stackelberg rather than of a Nash-Cournot game, seeing the Fed as the leader and the ECB the follower in monetary policy actions.

**Table 2: ECB reaction functions (Taylor rules)**

Dependent variable: $i_t^{ECB}$	$\alpha$	$g_1$	$g_2$	$g_3$	$r$	Dummy variable 4M1999	$R^2 - adj$ DW
<b>Headline inflation:</b>							
Baseline: Eq.(2)	0.86 (10.72)	0.17 (3.99)	0.05 (8.20)	-	0.79 (35.67)	-0.43 (3.56)	0.956 2.11
Long-run coefficients	4.02	0.80	0.25	-	-	-	
With Fed FR: Eq. (3)	0.34 (3.39)	0.12 (3.88)	0.04 (3.51)	0.16 (8.01)	0.69 (38.90)	-0.53 (4.70)	0.963 2.28
Long-run coefficients	1.08	0.39	0.12	0.50	-	-	
<b>Core inflation:</b>							
Baseline: Eq. (2')	0.17 (1.24)	0.05 (1.25)	0.02 (1.56)	-	0.96 (32.57)	-0.50 (10.35)	0.941 1.77
Long-run coefficients	4.75	1.39	0.56	-	-	-	
With Fed FR: Eq. (3')	0.43 (1.63)	0.65 (6.26)	0.08 (3.77)	0.27 (9.13)	0.59 (10.46)	-0.44 (3.63)	0.945 1.50
Long-run coefficients	1.06	1.60	0.20	0.67	-	-	

Estimation method: GMM – Generalized Method of Moments. The dependent variable is ECB's interest rate for main refinancing operations (MFO); Fed FR is the US federal funds rate. t-values are in parenthesis below the estimated coefficients.

Monthly data; the sample is 1999:01 – 2001:12. The instruments are:  $p_{t-1}, \dots, p_{t-4}$ ,  $wp_{t-1}, \dots, wp_{t-1}$ ,  $y_{t-1}, \dots, y_{t-4}$ ,  $b_{t-1}, \dots, b_{t-3}$ , where  $p$  is the inflation gap as the deviation of actual inflation rate from target for the HICP (headline in Eq. (2) and (3)) and for core inflation in Eq. (2') and Eq. (3')),  $wp$  is the annual inflation rate of world commodity prices in USD (HWWA index),  $y$  is the output gap measured as the deviation of actual from trend (HP method) and  $b$  is business tendency survey for manufacturing in Euroland (OECD data).


The major argument put forward here is that the ECB could have contributed to a better overall economic outcome in the last two years if it – instead of sticking to the total (headline) inflation rate, measured by the HICP – would have reacted to the “core” inflation rate in Euroland. First we will demonstrate that the Taylor rule based on the core inflation rate would have resulted in a one percentage point lower interest rate level. Second we simulate the macroeconomic effects of such a less restrictive monetary policy in chapter 4.

If one re-estimates the Taylor rules of equations (2) and (3) by substituting the “core” HICP inflation rate for  $p_t$ , one gets the following results (see table 2). The same estimation method (GMM with the same instrument structure – but now with lagged core inflation rates) and the same specification is applied and the equations with core inflation are called (2') and (3') respectively. The estimated parameters for equation (3') – the “alternative Taylor rule approach” - considering the Fed FR gives a better overall result. However using Fed's FR indicates the strong dependency from the US policy making (long-run coefficient 0.67). The correct way to estimate the potential interest rate when targeting (autonomously) the inflation rate gap is the “baseline Taylor rule approach” of equation (2'). The results

show that the estimated coefficients for the inflation and the output gap are of low statistical significance. Estimating the interest rate path with the parameters of equation (3') show a much lower interest rate level for MFO (see figure 6). On average, the ECB's interest rate would have been lower by around one percentage point from the second quarter 2000 to the third quarter 2001.<sup>51</sup> At the end, however, the Taylor rule with core inflation would have resulted in a somewhat higher interest rate level as the actual ones.

**Figure 6: ECB interest rate policy and Taylor rules**

(ECB interest rate for MFO)



Source: Own calculations based on data from the ECB.

### III. The economic impact of the first external shock in EMU

World oil prices started to increase when EMU started into its third stage in the first quarter 1999 at a level of 11.1 US-dollar per barrel (Brent crude spot oil). The oil price peaked in the third quarter 2000 at a level of 30.3 \$/barrel. Since then it has declined gradually, exhibiting a very short-lived jump after September 11, 2001 and declined afterwards when the economic outcome in the industrial world became more and more gloomy. As a consequence of the conflict of Israel with the Palestinians in Spring 2002 the oil price started to climb again. As was demonstrated already (see figure 3) the oil price hike since 1999 together with the depreciation of the euro translated into an additional increase of

<sup>51</sup> For a similar evaluation with a Taylor rule, taking "core inflation" as the relevant inflation rate for the normative rule, see the European Commission, *EU* (2001a) pp. 56-57, although the Taylor rule used there

headline HICP inflation in the euro area since mid-1999 of around one half of a percentage point and during 2000, until autumn 2001 of more than one percentage point.

With the oil price hike of 1999-2001 – a classical temporary supply shock - Euroland experienced the first baptism of fire. What was the macroeconomic outcome inside Euroland and outside of it? In order to estimate this one has to make an assumption as to a “normal” development of oil prices in this period. We assume a smoothing path between the second quarter of 1999 up to the third quarter of 2001. The effect of the oil price increase from this “normal” path of 12% in 1999Q2, 30% from 1999Q3 to 2000Q4, 18% from 2001Q1 to 2001Q2 and 10% in 2001Q3 was simulated (see figure 3).

*Box 1: NiGEM – A world macro model*

The simulations were carried out by the NiGEM world macro model of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research.<sup>52</sup> The model consists of the standard demand- and supply-side specifications with spill-overs via foreign trade. The model covers – among all industrial and many developing countries - all EU countries (except Luxembourg). So, one can differentiate between the 11 euro area countries and the three pre-ins (Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The simulations were done here with the rational forward-looking option for long rates, wages, exchange rates, equity prices and inflation. When the exchange rate is forward-looking its current value is determined by the current interest rate differential and contemporaneous expectations of the exchange rate next period. As policy options the European aggregation is chosen, that means European exchange rates for the Euroland members are fixed against each other and movements of interest rates are the same for the Euroland countries. Interest rates and exchange rates are then determined according to “European targeting”, where monetary policy is determined by Euroland economic conditions (an alternative would be “German targeting” – a reminder of the EMS system). This option proxies EMU where the ECB decides monetary policy but allocates weights to economic conditions in all the countries included in the Euroland aggregation. There are several interest rate options: a) Nominal GDP and inflation targeting; this proxies best the “two pillar” strategy of the ECB and is used in the following simulations; b) Inflation targeting only looks at deviations from inflation target; c) Taylor rule.<sup>53</sup>

Given the chosen assumptions of the oil price hike of around 30% in the period 1999 to 2001 the model simulations executed with the NiGEM world macro model (for a model

---

is not made explicit.

<sup>52</sup> NIESR, London; see *Barrell/Dury/Holland* (2001)

description, see box) resulted in the following macroeconomic impact for the Euro area as a whole (see figure 7).<sup>54</sup>

Real GDP in Euroland decreased by 0.4 percentage points until the end of 2001 and leveled off thereafter. HICP inflation increased by 0.8 percentage points. The oil price shock also contributed to a depreciation of the euro against the USD by 0.3%. The Euro area's current account deteriorated by 0.8 percentage points of GDP due to the negative terms-of-trade effects of the shock. Also the budget policy was negatively affected by around 0.4% of GDP. Short-term interest rates, the unemployment rate and the debt to GDP ratio increased. Overall, the oil price shock hit the economy of Euroland adversely.<sup>55</sup>

The aggregate impact of the first external shock to Euroland is one aspect, but the oil price shock affected differently real GDP of the Member States of the euro area (see figure A1) and those of the pre-ins area of the EU (see figure A2).

In the euro area (see figure A1) the biggest negative GDP impact is found for Ireland, Spain and Austria (all exhibiting a decline of GDP of 0.8 percentage points until the end of 2001), followed by France and Italy (-0.6 percentage points). Portugal, Finland, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany were hit the least by the shock (between -0.1 and -0.2 percentage points). Nevertheless, the oil price shock increased the dispersion of the Euroland business cycle or stopped its convergence (see table 1). The pre-ins (see figure A2) - at least those countries - which more or less appreciated their currencies against the euro (the United Kingdom and Sweden) could isolate their economies from the negative impact of the oil price shock. The others, which either fixed their exchange rate to the euro

---


<sup>53</sup> Source: <http://www.niesr.ac.uk/models/nigem/nigem.htm>

<sup>54</sup> *Hunt/Isard/Laxton* (2002) simulate the macroeconomic effect of hypothetical 50 per cent oil price shock over the period 2000-2010 with IMF' MULTIMOD. They distinguish between a temporary (50 per cent oil price increase in the first year), a persistent shock (first two years) and a permanent shock over the whole period. Instead of Taylor rules, they use monetary policy reaction functions with forward-looking inflation-forecast-based (IFB) rules. Additionally, they study the effects/costs of the optimal reaction of monetary policy to oil price increases by considering the difficult pass-through of oil prices into core and headline inflation. The pass-through of oil prices into core inflation depends heavily on the kind of shocks (temporary versus permanent). A Delayed monetary policy reactions - because of the uncertainties about the effects of oil-price increases on core inflation - might affect the process of inflation expectations. The assumed forward-looking monetary policy reaction function of MULTIMOD implies that adjustments to changes in the output gap and the inflation forecasts occur with no delay. Delaying the policy reaction - that is, holding the short-term nominal interest rate constant and allowing inflation expectations to rise - has expansionary effects on GDP in the short run but leads to a much sharper interest-rate response by the third year, with subsequent contractionary effects on GDP.

<sup>55</sup> In its standard shock analysis with the INTERLINK model the OECD (see *Dalgaard/André/Richardson* (2001)) finds that a 50% oil price increase (corresponding to a \$12 ½ rise if the oil price is \$25 per barrel) results in a decline of real GDP in the euro area of 0.4% in the first and 0.2% in the second year after the shock. Inflation goes up by 0.6% in the first and 0.2% in the second year. Similar, but somewhat lower effects are found for the USA and for Japan. In a comparable exercise the European Commission *EU* (2001a) p. 28, simulating a \$12 increase in oil prices with their QUEST world macro model, real GDP in the euro area would decrease by 0.2 in the first year, by 0.4 in the second year and by 0.2 percentage points in the third year after the shock; inflation would increase by 0.7 in the first, by 0.4 in the second and by 0.2 percentage points in the third year.

(like Denmark) or participated in the ERM-II (like Greece in 1999 and 2000, before entering EMU in 2001) exhibited a negative output effect of the oil price shock (Greece, however, improved after the short-term negative impact).

**Figure 7: Euro area: Macro-economic effects of a world oil price shock**  
(30% increase 1999Q2-2001Q3)



Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

Similarly to the output impact, the oil price shock increased dispersion of the inflation performance in Euroland. With the exception of Ireland, it worked against the dispersion which one would have expected from the Balassa/Samelson effect. This external shock brought the amazing divergence process of price inflation in Euroland to a stop in 2000. The oil price shock increased HICP inflation rates by 1.8% in Ireland, by over 1% in France and Italy and below 1% in the other euro area countries. The lowest inflation effect was felt in Portugal and Spain (below the average Euroland effect; see figure A3). Out of the pre-ins countries (see figure A4), Denmark (+1.2 percentage points) exhibited an inflation shock above Euroland average, the United Kingdom inflation increase of 0.8 percentage points coincided with Euroland average, those of Sweden and Greece was below average, although Greece's inflation performance deteriorated after fixing its exchange rate when entering the EMU in 2001.

#### IV. A better outcome by an alternative monetary policy reaction?

What are the conclusions after the first external shock to Euroland for monetary policy? First, one could be satisfied with the actual policy reaction by the ECB. Second – and this position is preferred here – one could look for ways to optimize monetary policy. In order to mitigate the oil price shock, monetary policy could have reacted not only to total (“headline”) HICP inflation but to “core” inflation. This would also be consistent with the second pillar of the “two pillar” strategy, namely a broad analysis of all price developments. By sticking only to headline inflation – because its rate already overshoot the self-declared target of 2% (see figure 3) – monetary policy was too tight during the past two years. As the 2000/01 oil price shock was a classical temporary supply shock, also theory would have suggested for targeting core inflation.<sup>56</sup>

How should the monetary policy stance be evaluated? In practice this is often done by many NCBs (for an overview of the different approaches and problems associated, see *Gerlach/Smets (2000)*) as well as by private banks with the so-called Monetary Conditions Index (MCI). The MCI combines the transmission of two channels of monetary policy: the interest rate and the exchange rate channel. The MCI represents the relative size of the interest rate and exchange rate impacts in a country on either output (real GDP) and inflation. A ratio of X to 1 implies that a change in the exchange rate by X percent has the equivalent impact to a 100 basis point change in the interest rate. Thus the larger the ratio the weaker is the relative impact of the exchange rate. Generally, large and relatively closed economies such as the USA or Japan are thought to have ratios of around 10 to 1 and very open (small) economies around 2 or 3 to 1.<sup>57</sup> The MCI is defined as

$$(4) \quad MCI_t = \sum_s w_s (P_{st} - P_{s0}),$$

where the  $P_s$  are variables related to monetary policy actions ( $1, \dots, s$ )  $A_j$  ( $j$  indicating the actions available: interest rates in levels, exchange rates in log form) thought to affect demand (real GDP,  $Y$ ) or inflation ( $\mathbf{p}$ ). Thus there will be relationships of the form

$$(5) \quad Y = f(P_{1, \dots, s}, X), \quad \text{or} \quad \mathbf{p} = g(P_{1, \dots, s}, X),$$

<sup>56</sup> See *Begg/Canova/De Grauwe/Fatás/Lane (2002)*, p. 17. According to them a permanent supply shock (e.g. a rise in oil price) shifts the short-run supply curve to the left and reduces full-capacity (potential) output. As output exceeds its new long-run level, inflation increases. The correct response is to increase interest rates in order to reduce aggregate demand. In case of a temporary supply shock (as the 2000/01 oil price shock), however, full-capacity output remains unaffected. The shift of the short-run supply curve brings output below capacity and hence is no risk for inflation. The correct response of the central bank is not to react. Such a policy rule can be implemented by formulating the targeting strategy in terms of “core inflation”, which ignores the effects of temporary supply shocks on inflation.

<sup>57</sup> See *Mayes/Virén (2000)* p. 201.

$X$  representing all the other variables in the model that also have an impact on demand (real GDP, or inflation). The weights  $w_s$  will be computed from the partial derivatives of the appropriate elements in  $f$  (or  $g$ ) including due allowance for the dynamic structure. An MCI is thus conditional on a particular model of the economy. Normally, MCIs are computed on the basis of the effects on real GDP.

*Mayes/Virén* (2000) suggest that the MCI for the euro area will be only 3.5 (compared to 10 for the USA and 6.0 used by the European Commission in its Autumn 2001 Forecast; see EU, 2001b, p. 6). My calculations with the NiGEM world macro model confirm the value derived by *Mayes/Virén* (2000) of around 3.0. The European Commission in its Autumn 2001 forecasts for 2001 to 2003<sup>58</sup> evaluates the monetary conditions for the euro area. By combining real interest rates (approximated by the difference between the 3-month rate and core inflation) and real exchange rates (based on unit labor costs in manufacturing), the Commission derives the monetary conditions index (MCI) as a synthetic measure of the change in monetary conditions vis-à-vis a reference period. The loosening in monetary conditions in the euro area since January 1999 were mainly due to the real depreciation of the euro, which only slightly reverted in the first three quarters of 2001. In contrast, since mid-1999 real interest rates increased and only since the end of 2000 have they decreased. At the end of 2001 the real interest rates have returned to their starting level due to gradually increasing core inflation, and the recent cuts in policy rates. As a result monetary conditions remain – according to the European Commission - conducive to growth.

The gradual increase of the MCI, indicating a continuous loosening of ECB's monetary policy stance since 1999, does not preclude that it could not have been improved by a more adequate policy reaction after the oil price shock. The ECB – although it can (and did) intervene in foreign exchange markets – use only one “instrument” for monetary policy, namely the ability to exert substantial control over short-term interest rates. The ECB therefore cannot exert any lasting control over the mix of monetary conditions between interest rates and the exchange rate. As the European Commission confirms, the easing of monetary conditions, measured by the MCI came from the euro depreciation.<sup>59</sup>

What would have been the macroeconomic outcome of a monetary policy of the ECB, oriented to the core inflation? Instead of raising interest rates a decrease – as derived in


---

<sup>58</sup> See EU (2001b) p. 6.

<sup>59</sup> My simulations of a sustained 10% depreciation of the Euro vis à vis the US-Dollar with the NiGEM world macro model indicate the following result: real GDP increased by 1% in the first, by 1.2% in the second, by 1% in the third and by 0.9% in the fourth year. Inflation increased by 0.4% in the first, by 1.1% in the second, by 1.9% in the third and by 2.5% in the fourth year. Behind the sustained 10% depreciation of the euro the real effective exchange rate of the euro depreciates by 4.2% in the first, by 3% in the second, by 2.1% in the third and by 1.3% in the fourth year.

subchapter C - would have been adequate. In order to simulate the effects of a looser monetary policy the impact of a one percentage point cut in the short-term interest rate of the euro area in the period 2000Q2 to 2001Q3 is simulated with the NiGEM world macro-model.

**Figure 8: Euro area: Macro-economic effects of an interest rate cut**  
(1% decrease of short-term interest rates in the euro area 2000Q2-2001Q3)



Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

In the euro area as a whole a looser monetary policy (a 1% cut of short-term interest rates over seven quarters) would have resulted in a slight increase of real GDP (+0.2 percentage points),<sup>60</sup> a decline in the unemployment rate (of around 0.1 percentage points) and the debt to GDP ratio (by 0.4% of GDP), an improvement in the current account (by 0.2% of GDP) and in the fiscal balance (below 0.2% of GDP) and interestingly without much increase of inflation – below 0.1 percentage points till 2002 and thereafter up to 0.1 percentage points compared to base line (see figure 8). The interest rate cut of one percentage point would have led to an immediate depreciation of the euro against the dollar by the same amount

<sup>60</sup> *Dalgaard/André/Richardson* (2001) find with the OECD INTERLINK model that a sustained drop in short term and long term interest rates of 1 percentage point with fixed exchange rates leads to an increase in real GDP in the euro area of 0.4 percentage points in the first year and increasing to 0.6 percentage points in the second year and staying at that level thereafter. The transmission effects of interest rate cuts on the real economy and the price system, simulated with the NiGEM model are the higher, the longer lasting such cuts are. This is due to the forward-looking behavior of agents assumed in the model. If, e.g. the short term interest rates are cut not only over one year, but sustained over a period of seven years, real GDP increases by 0.8% in the first, by 1.3% in the second, by 1.4% in the third and by 1.3% in the fourth year. HICP inflation increases by 0.2% in the first, by 0.4% in the second, by 0.7% in the third and by 1.2%

leading to a real effective depreciation of the euro of 0.7%, but declining shortly thereafter. The peak of the transmission of the expansionary monetary policy to the real economy (GDP) is reached after 5 quarters, those of inflation peaks after 16 quarters after starting with the monetary shock. This is in line with other simulations of the transmission of monetary policy in the literature (see e.g. *Mihov* (2001) with a VAR model approach).<sup>61</sup>

Again the interesting aspect of this exercise is the different impact in the Euroland member states. As the economies of Euroland are far from being equal and fully synchronized as far as the business cycle of real GDP is concerned (see table 1), the transmission of monetary policy to output (and other macro variables) must be different. As figure A5 shows, a more expansionary monetary policy over the last two years would have resulted in higher GDP stimulation in Germany and Austria than in Portugal or Belgium. The real GDP effects spreads from ¼ percentage points to only 0.1 percentage points. Additionally, the speed of adjustment differs between the Euroland Member States. Although the overall impact of a one percentage point increase of short-term interest rates is very modest, it nevertheless would have resulted in a mitigation of the downturn of the business cycle in the euro area. However, the experiment also indicates that each monetary shock leads to a general disturbance of the process of the synchronization of the European business cycle,<sup>62</sup> often claimed as being necessary to fulfill the OCA (optimum currency area) criteria.<sup>63</sup>

---

in the fourth year. By contrast *Mihov* (2000) p. 383, finds output responses to a 1% interest rate cut over the same period of only half of that size with a simple VAR model.

<sup>61</sup> For an overview of the main determinants of the transmission of monetary policy to output and the different transmission channels (interest rates, exchange rates, credit and bank lending, balance-sheet), see *EU* (2001a) p. 58. The numerous attempts to estimate the extent of possible asymmetries in output and price responses to the single monetary policy across Euroland countries (via empirical macroeconomic models) have not provided a consistent and robust picture of cross-country differences in monetary transmission and they are affected by methodological problems (Lucas problem). This state of affairs has revamped interest in microeconomic studies comparing economic and financial structures across countries, as they are ultimately responsible for any differences in the way monetary impulses are transmitted throughout the economy; see *EU* (2001a) pp. 57-59; *Clements/Kontolemis/Levy* (2001) and *Suardi* (2001); *Angeloni/Kashyap/Mojon/Terlizzese* (2001) for an overview of the present status of research for Euroland.

<sup>62</sup> Many attempts to find a “common European business cycle” have failed so far; see a recent exercise by *Breitung/Candelon* (2001). Accordingly, the common cycle hypothesis is clearly rejected for U.K. (industrial production) data whereas some weak evidence for a joint cyclical pattern is found for France, the Netherlands, Austria and Germany. *Artis/Zhang* (1999) show that the business cycle affiliation of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) member countries has shifted from the United States to Germany since the formation of the ERM. In the same period, however, the United Kingdom’s business cycle affiliation did not change. In contrast, *Inklaar/de Haan* (2001) in an empirical study covering the years 1960-1997 find no relationship between exchange rate stability (e.g. EMS period) and business cycle synchronization.

<sup>63</sup> *Mihov* (2001) p. 385, demonstrated that neither a complete symmetric transmission mechanism of monetary policy nor a complete synchronization of the business cycle is a necessary condition for the functioning of a currency union. The diversity across five EMU countries he analyzed is not uniformly larger than across US regions. In fact, the USA is more diverse than the five EMU countries. May be that not ex ante OCA criteria (the intensity of trade with other members; the correlation of domestic business cycles with other members) have to be fulfilled when entering a monetary union, but that it is enough to fulfill them ex post. *Frankel/Rose* (1998) favor this position. As international trade patterns and

In the pre-ins area of the EU, only the United Kingdom exhibited slight negative spillovers from the interest rate cut in Euroland, a result consistent with the classical two-country Mundell-Fleming model with flexible exchange rates. The other pre-ins (Denmark, Greece and Sweden) had effects comparable with those of Euroland average (see figure A6).

The inflation effects of the temporary interest rate cut are generally very modest. Only Ireland (see figure A7) stands out at the beginning. But even in the medium run the inflation increasing effect is not higher than 0.15 percentage points. The dispersion of the inflation effects is weaker than those of real output effects. With the exception of the United Kingdom (where it is slightly negative) the inflation effects are similar in the pre-ins countries (see figure A8).

## V. Conclusions

Overall, the ECB managed monetary policy quite satisfactorily in the first phase of EMU. However, one may ask whether monetary policy really was optimal. The estimated Taylor reaction function indicates that monetary policy was rather backward than forward-looking. On the one hand it reacted with a lag to the actions of US's Fed. On the other hand it was overly cautious as it was targeting total HICP inflation. In this paper it is argued and also demonstrated with model simulations that a monetary policy that targets inflation measured by total HICP was not optimal given the fact that Euroland was confronted with the first external (oil price) shock. The oil price shock led to an increase in headline inflation of over one percentage point in 2000/2001. By setting interest rates according to the underlying or "core" inflation the monetary policy stance could have been looser without risking additional inflation. The latter is demonstrated in simulation experiments with a world macro model. For the future the ECB could – without giving up the "two pillar" strategy – orient its policy reaction more to "core" than to total inflation. Of course one could argue that it is difficult to orient monetary policy forward-looking as most of the price forecasts – in particular those for commodity prices (and therefore also those for crude oil) – are chronically false. In fact, the OECD as well as the European Commission in their 1999 December forecasts underestimated the oil price development for the year 2000 by 25% to 30% and those for the year 2001 by around 10%. In 2000, they gradually adjusted their forecast to the correct values!

---

international business cycle correlations are endogenous, they conclude that countries with closer trade links tend to have more tightly correlated business cycles. Hence, they derive the "endogeneity of the OCA criteria".

## References:


- Alesina A. / Blanchard O. / Gali J. / Giavazzi F. / Uhlig H.* (2001), Defining a Macroeconomic Framework for the Euro Area: Monitoring the European Central Bank 3 (MECB3), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, 2001.
- Angeloni I. / Kashyap A. / Mojon B. / Terlizzese D.* (2001), Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area: Where Do We Stand?, Paper prepared for the conference: "Monetary Policy Transmission in the Euro Area", European Central Bank, pp. 18-19, December 2001.
- Artis M. J. / Zhang W.* (1999), "Further Evidence on the International Business Cycle and the ERM: Is There a European Business Cycle?", in: Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 51, No. 1, January 1999, pp. 120-132.
- Barrell R. / Dury K. / Holland D.* (2001), Macro-Models and the Medium Term. The NIESR experience with NiGEM, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, London (unpublished paper), June 2001.
- Begg D. / Canova F. / De Grauwe P. / Fatás A. / Lane P.R.* (2002), Surviving the Slowdown: Monitoring the European Central Bank 4 (MECB4), Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London, 2002.
- Beetsma R. / Debrun X. / Klaassen F.* (2001), Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?, in: CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 3035, London, October 2001.
- Benigno P.* (2001), Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Area, in: CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 2755, London, April 2001.
- Breitung J. / Candelon B.* (2001), "Is There a Common European Business Cycle? New Insights from a Frequency Domain Analysis", Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), in: Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung ("Business Cycle Research in the European Economic and Monetary Union"), Heft 3/70, 2001, pp. 331-338.
- Breuss F.* (2000a), "Flexibility, fiscal policy and stability and growth pact", in: *Fourth ECSA-World Conference – The European Union and the EURO: economic, institutional and international aspects*, European Commission, Luxembourg 2000, pp. 98-126.
- Breuss F.* (2000b), "Die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion und ihre Folgen", in: *Breuss F. / Fink G. / Grillier St.* (eds.), Vom Schuman-Plan zum Vertrag von Amsterdam: Entstehung und Zukunft der EU, Springer-Verlag, Wien/New York, 2000, pp. 273-309.
- Breuss F. / Weber A.* (2001), "Economic Policy Coordination in the EMU: Implications for the Stability and Growth Pact", in: *Hughes-Hallet A. / Mooslechner P. / Martin Sch.* (eds.), Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston/Dordrecht/London, 2001, pp. 143-167.
- Brunila A. / Buti M. / Franco D.* (eds.) (2001), The Stability and Growth Pact. The architecture of fiscal policy in EMU, Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2001.
- Canzoneri Matthew B. / Cumby Robert E. / Diba Behzad T.* (2001), "Fiscal discipline and exchange rate systems", in: The Economic Journal, Vol. 111, No. 474, October 2001, pp. 667-690.
- Clarida R.* (2001), "The Empirics of Monetary Policy Rules in Open Economies", in: International Journal of Finance and Economics 6(4), October 2001, pp. 315-323.
- Clarida R. / Gali J. / Gertler M.* (1998), "Monetary policy rules in practice. Some international evidence", in: European Economic Review Vol. 42, No. 6, June 1998, pp. 1033-1067.
- Clarida R. / Gali J. / Gertler M.* (2001), "Optimal Monetary Policy in Open versus Closed Economies: An Integrated Approach", in: The American Economic Review 91(2), May 2001, pp. 248-252.

- Clements Benedict J. / Kontolemis Zenon G. / Levy J.* (2001), Monetary Policy Under EMU: Differences in the Transmission Mechanism?“, in: IMF Working Paper No. 102, Washington 2001.
- Cristadoro R. / Forni M. / Reichlin L. / Veronese G.* (2001), A Core Inflation Index for the Euro Area“, in: CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No. 3097, London, December 2001.
- Dalsgaard Th. / André Ch. / Richardson P.* (2001), Standard Shocks in the OECD INTERLINK Model, in: OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 306, September 6, 2001.
- De Grauwe P. / Piskorski T.* (2001), Union-Wide Aggregates versus National Data Based Monetary Policies: Does it Matter for the Eurosystem?, in: CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 3036, London, November 2001.
- Goodhart C.* (1999), “Central Banks and Uncertainty“, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, February 1999.
- ECB* (1999a), “The stability-oriented monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem“, in: ECB Monthly Bulletin, January 1999, pp. 39-50.
- ECB* (1999b), “Euro area monetary aggregates and their role in the Eurosystem’s monetary policy strategy“, in: ECB Monthly Bulletin, February 1999, pp. 29-46.
- ECB* (2001a), “Measures of underlying inflation in the euro area“, in: ECB Monthly Bulletin, July 2001, pp. 49-59.
- ECB* (2001b), “The economic policy framework in EMU“, in: ECB Monthly Bulletin, November 2001, pp. 51-65.
- Eijffinger Sylvester C.W. / de Haan J.* (2001), European monetary and fiscal policy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.
- EU* (2001a), The EU Economy 2001 Review, in: European Economy No. 73, Brussels 2001.
- EU* (2001b), Autumn 2001 Forecasts for 2001-2003, European Economy, Supplement A, in: Economic Trends No. 10/11 – October/November, Brussels 2001.
- EU* (2001c), Price levels and price dispersion in the EU, European Economy, Supplement A, in: Economic Trends No. 7 – July, Brussels 2001.
- Frankel J. / Andrew Rose K.* (1998), “The Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area Criteria“, in: The Economic Journal Vol. 108, No. 449, July 1998, pp. 1009-1025.
- Gerlach St. / Smets F.* (2000), “MCI’s and Monetary Policy“, in: European Economic Review Vol. 44, No. 9, October 2000, pp. 1677-1700.
- Hunt B. / Isard P. / Douglas L.* (2002), “The Macroeconomic Effects of Higher Oil Prices“, in: National Institute Economic Review No. 179, NIESR, London, January 2002/1, pp. 87-103.
- Inklaar R. / de Haan J.* (2001), “Is there really a European business cycle? A comment“, in: Oxford Economic Papers 53, pp. 215-220.
- Issing O.* (2001), “The Challenge for Monetary Policy: a European Perspective“, [www.ecb.int](http://www.ecb.int) (key speeches).
- Issing O. / Gaspar V. / Angeloni I. / Tristani O.* (2001), Monetary policy in the Euro area: strategy and decision-making at the European Central Bank, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001.
- Mayes D. / Virén M.* (2000), “The exchange rate and monetary conditions in the Euro Area“, in: Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv/ Review of World Economics, Heft 2, Band 136, June 2000, pp. 199-231.
- McKibbin Warwick J. / Sachs J. D.* (1991), Global Linkages: Macroeconomic Interdependence and Cooperation in the World Economy, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1991.
- Mihov I.* (2001), “Monetary policy implementation and transmission in the European Monetary Union“, in: Economic Policy No. 33, October 2001, pp. 369-406.

- Reutter M. / Sinn H.-W.* (2000), The Minimum Inflation Rate for Euroland, in: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 377, Munich, December 2000.
- Schuberth H.* (2000), Monetary Policy Rules in Europe: Which Rule for the Eurosystem?, Dissertation at the Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration, April 2000, 24 et seqq.
- Suardi M.* (2001), "EMU and asymmetries in the monetary policy transmission", EC DG ECFIN, in: Economic Papers No. 157, Brussels, July 2001.
- Svensson Lars E.O.* (2000), "The First Year of the Eurosystem: Inflation Targeting or Not?", in: American Economic Review 90(2), 2000, pp. 95-99.
- Taylor John B.* (1993), "Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice", in: Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1993 (39), pp. 195-214.
- Taylor John B.* (2001), The Role of the Exchange Rate in Monetary Policy Rules, draft, Stanford University, 2001.


Appendix:

**Figure A1: Euro area: GDP effects of a world oil price shock**  
(30% increase 1999Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A2: Pre-ins area: GDP effects of a world oil price shock**  
(30% increase 1999Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A3: Euro area: HICP inflation effects of a world oil price shock**  
(30% increase 1999Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A4: Pre-ins area: HICP inflation effects of a world oil price shock**  
(30% increase 1999Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A5: Euro area: GDP effects of an interest rate cut**  
(1% decrease of short-term interest rates in the euro area 2000Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A6: Pre-ins area: GDP effects of an interest rate cut**  
(1% decrease of short-term interest rates in the euro area 2000Q2-2001Q3)




Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A7: Euro area: HICP inflation effects of an interest rate cut**  
(1% decrease of short-term interest rates in the euro area 2000Q2-2001Q3)



Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.

**Figure A8: Pre-ins area: HICP inflation effects of an interest rate cut**  
(1% decrease of short-term interest rates in the euro area 2000Q2-2001Q3)



Source: Own calculations with the NiGEM world macro model.